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The bas·ic 1:.heme of th is presentation can be stated very s imply: 
the excessively rapid expansion of government regulation of business 
is slowing down the rate of i nnovation and scient ific progress in the 
Un ited States . But the answer is not to propose the elimination of 
g.overnment regulation, Rather , the sensib'1 e approach i s to reform the 
existing array of regulation so as to achieve important soci al objectives 
• 
with less of the adverse side effects. 
The slowdown in research and development that has been occurring 
in this nation is pervasive and can be measured in many ways. In real 
terms (constant 1972 dollars), R & D spending i n the United States has 
been an a plateau of sli gh tly under $30 billi on a year since 1965. 
Pri vate sector R & 0--which rose at an annual rate of over seven percent 
in the period 1953-67--has been increasing at a modest two percent a year 
since . 
The empl oyment of scientists and en9ineers in industry in 1975 
. \ {the latest period for wh ich data are ava1lable 1 was lower than in 1968 
--1,031,000 versus l ,046,000. This compares to a 19 pf~rcent increase 
in the 1964-65 period . In 1973, the Patent Office issued fewer patents 
to U. S. nationals than in 1963, but patents i ssued to forei gn nationals 
more than doub 1 ed during the. same decade . The enro 11 ments for advance 
... i aH' ,. ., , ,. ..... · u .,,.,..,. ·• - =• ·• 
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degrees in science and engineering have represented a steadily shrinking 
sha re of coll ege enrollments since 1965. These are all measures of 
stagnati on (or worse) in our commi tment to technological innovation, at 
a time when expenditures in most other sectors of the economy have been 
• grow1ng. 
The pervasive slowdmvn in productivity and new capital formation 
that the American economy has been experiencing in recent years--as well 
as the rise in inflation--are al l interrelated aspects of the phenomenon 
tha t I have been describing. Let us first examine the impact of 
government regulation on the resources avail able for investment in new 
products and ne\-J processes. Subsequently, 1 et us turn to the possi bi 1 i ty 
of improving public policy so as to better meet the true, long term needs 
of the co~suming public. 
It is important to understand t he direct connection between over-
regulation by government in t he first instance and the subsequent pl eas 
for more detailed government i ntervention in business that may follow. 
To the extent that excessive government reg.ulat ion of business reduces 
the ab i lity of and incentive for bus i ness to invest in- technological 
innovation. important national objectives--greater j ob opportunities, 
rising l ivi ng standards , improved quality of life, etc.--are not achieved. 
Publ ic dis satisfaction with business performance is thus increased. 
This, in turn, sets the scene for another round of government involvement, 
. 
ranging from proposals to na t ionali ze specific industries to subsidizing 
others (always of course with more strings and federa l regulations). 
Energy is a clear example of this phenomenon and the pharmaceutical 
industry may be on the verge of providing another . 
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During the past year the public has learned about the direct effects 
of overregulation. I believe that it is accurate to report that we have 
succeeded in educating a large portion of the public about the extent to 
which excessive regulation increases the prices of the goods and services 
which they buy. Ou r citizens have been aroused by the knowledge that 
their tax dollars have been used to generate rules governing the frequency 
of cleaning spittoons, defining an exit, prescribing the size of toilet 
partitions, and telling us when a roof is a floor. Many people have also 
con1e to rea lize that hundreds of thousands of jobs have been eliminated 
as a result of federal rules . 
But what is not so obvious--yet of perhaps more fundamental impact--
is the extent to which regulation can absorb much of the potential growth 
in productivity that we expect from technological innovation and thus 
reduce the prospects for economi c advancement . 
One hidden cost of government regulation is a reduced rate of 
introduction of new products and improved production processes . The 
longer it takes for an innovation to be approved by a government agency 
- -or the more costly the approval procedures--the less likely that 
the new product or process will be introduced . In any event) innovation 
will be delayed. As William Carey of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science has stated, 11 Government may imagine that it is 
neutral toward the rate and quality of technological risk-taking, but 
it is not ... regulatory policies aimed at the public interest rarely 
consider impacts on innovation.'' To the extent that management attention 
is diverted from traditional product development concerns to meeting 
government-imposed social requirements, a significant but subtle 
bureaucratizat ion of business activity results. 
. . 
• • 
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Professor Sam Peltzman of the University of Chicago has estimated 
that the 1962 amendments to the Food and Drug Act are delaying the • 
introduction of effective drugs by about four years, as well as leading 
to higher prices for drugs. As a result in large part of the stringent 
drug approval regulations, the United States was the thirtieth country 
to approve the anti-asthma drug metaprotereno1, the thirty-second 
. 
country to approve the anti-cancer drug adriamycin, the fifty-first country 
to approve the anti-tuberculosis drug rifampin, the sixty-fourth to approve 
the anti-allergenic drug cromolyn, and the one hundred sixth to approve 
the anti-bacteri al drug co-trimaxazole. 
On · occasion .the regulators seem to have the private sector scared. 
. . . .. ' ,. ' ' ... 
In August 1975> the Nat1ona.l Cancer Institute reported. that the solvent 
. . . 
trichlore~hylene. known as TCE, might be a possible cause of cancer., 
• 
. . 
TCE at the time was used in decaffeinated coffee. It seems that the 
' ' · . . . . . . . .· . . ... . 
government used a ge.nerous dose of the chemica 1 on the test ani rna 1 s--
the equivalent of a person's drinki ng 50 million cups of decaffeinated 
. . . . .· 
coffee every day for an entire lifetime . But did the industry laugh at 
th.is example of governmental nonsense? Hardly. With the cyclamate 
.. 
. . 
epi·sode still firmly in ~ind and a saccharin ban being seriously 
.considered, one major producer quickly changed to another chemical. 
The ,governmen.ta 1 decision making process can have other adverse 
. . . . . 
effects on innovation by. creating uncertainty about the future of 
regulations governing -the introduction of new processes and products. 
An .example is the report of the task force of the Pres i dent ' s Energy 
. 
Resources Council dealing with the possibility of developing a new 
synthetic fuel industry. In evaluating the impact of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, the task force reported, 
~ 5 -
''It would be next to impossible at this time to predict the impact of 
these requirements on synthetic fue 1 s production. 11 Moreover~ in 
considering the National Environmental Policy Act, t he task force stated 
that the major uncertainty was not whether a project would be allowed 
to proceed, but rather the length of time that it would be delayed 
pending the issuance of an environmental impact statement that would 
stand up in court. The task for·ce pointed out, "The cost of such 
delays (construction financing and inflated raw materials and labor 
costs) is an obvious potential hazard to any synfuels project. 11 
In evaluating the overall impact of government regulatory activity, 
the task force concluded~ 11 In summary, some of these requirements cou1d 
easily hold up or permanently postpone any attempt to build and operate 
a synthetic fuel? p1ant. 11 
Similar sentiments have been expressed by executives of private 
R & D laboratories. B. L~ Williams, director of corporate research at 
Monsanto, has stated that it is not the regulations themselves or the 
threat of regulatory action, nonerous as they may be, but the _unpredict-
ability of such action 11 that is at the hea r t of the problem. 
Clearly) large and rising shares of corporate R & D budgets are 
being diverted from traditional efforts for product and process improve-
ment to meeting regulatory requirements. This trend is apparent in the 
automotive industry. According to the head of General Motors research 
laboratory, 11 We've diverted a 1arge share of ou·r resources--sometimes 
up to half--into meeting government regulations instead of developing 
better materials, better manufacturing techniques, and better products.~~ 
If long established products such as saccharin and creative new 
products are to be arbitrarily eliminated by governmental regulations, 
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the very threat of future, unforeseeable government action will force 
companies in other industri es, such as chemicals, to become mere 
conservat ive in allocating funds to R & 0, to devote their R & D 
budget to reactive and defensive research. Moreover, corporate 
investment funds which must be dedicated to meeting government-mandated 
social requirements are by definition not available for new R & D 
undertakings . 
The basic nature of the underlying public policy problem has 
been forcefully described by W. 0. Baker, head of the Bell Laboratories, 
as a '' bizarre conflict" between the presumptive laws and regulations 
of pervasive government i n a low-risk, wel fare society and 11 the present 
real ities of technical and scientific advance , which, mo re than ever, 
• • 
demand the freedom to experiment deeply and to innovate boldly. 11 
A related and generally overlooked aspect of the i mpact of 
government regul ati ans is that they tend to hit the sma 11 er· companies 
disproportionately hard . This is true i'rr ··every case that I have had the 
opportunity to examine--recordkeeping~ job safety, labor relations, 
environmental contro1s, etc. I unders tand that the Toxic Substances 
Control Act of 1976 (TOSCA) may also turn out to have such an undesirable 
effect . The members of this association we ll know t he costs being 
imposed on them by the new law and ultimately, of course, the consumer 
wi l l bear the burden of paying the hfgher prices that inevitably will 
result. 
But what may not be apparent to most people is t he basical ly 
anticompetitive nature of these regul ati ons. I do not mean to under-
estimate the problems that are being faced by the larger companies . 
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But I believe that it is realistic to expect that most of them will 
be able to adjust to the expanded regulatory environment. It is the 
smaller companies that may be more adversely affected . Many of them 
may have more difficulty surviving as independent entities. The 
foundry i ndustry surely provides a cogent case in point; generally, 
it has been the smaller plants that have been forced to close down 
in t he face of rising government-mandated costs . 
Increasingly, business is operating in an environment in which 
the applicat ion of the fruits of science and engineering to products 
and services is coming under detailed government scrutiny far in 
advance of their widespread use. Federal controls are having their 
i mpact at every major stage of the product cycle . 
Even though the expansion of government regulation of business 
i s des igned to benefit the consuming public~ it is the consumer who 
ultimately pays the added costs that invariably result . Yet, the key 
price that this nation may be paying is the attenuation of the ris k-bearing 
and entrepreneuri al characteristi·cs of our private enterprise system 
whi ch, in the past, have contr--ibuted so effectively to rapid rates of 
productivity, growth and progress . 
The ~e.e.~ . .f.o.J:: .I~n~!?va_t..1.9.~'L .i !1 . Govern.!.nenJ .. ~~.9.u.l.~!J.9~ . 9.f Bus i r,e~ -~-
What can be done to improve the public policy envi ronment in whi ch 
business operates? To summarize very tersely and perhaps too simply, 
. 
there are two fundamentally different approaches that are simultaneously 
being urged on government policymakers. One is to extend further the 
scope of government regu1ation--to set up a consumer advocacy agency, 
to oversee the activities of multinational corporations , to use the 
government ' s chartering power to alter the basic function and organization 
l 
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of the moder·n corporation 5• to e><tend antitrust activities to affect a 
splitting up of the larger American corporations, and to establish a 
centralized planning system embracing the economi c activities of both 
the public and the private sectors. This f irst approach in its 
essence woul d i nvolve government far mo r·e deeply in the day-to ... day 
functioning of the business system. That type of action would be in 
t he natur·e of the traditional hangover remedy~ known as 11 having a bit 
of the hair of the dog that bit you . n 
The second approach is in many ways a more modest one and not a 
mono 1 i thi c viewpoint, and it is the one that I advocate. This vte~·! 
considers t he existing total ity of government regulation as an 
extremely vast and ambitious undertaking. Therefore , this second 
approach , i,s conc.~ rned with the serious shot'tcomings of exis t ing 
regulatory efforts and stresses opportunities for reform. 
Several different avenues for regulatory reform can be identified. 
The f irst relates to the ol der regulatory commissions each of which 
has jurisdiction over one or a few related industri es. Here is where 
the issue of deregulation has been r·aised and~ on occasion, may be 
an appropriate response. Frankly , one of the factors that has muddied 
the waters is that many of t he proponents of the newer· regu l atory 
programs have been scared--perhaps need1essly--by fears that the general 
ta l k about deregulation extends to envi ronmental , safety) personnel, 
and the newer areas of government involvement , and it does not . 
Sensibly, the discussion of deregulation relates to the ICC and 
CAB t ypes of act ivity, vJhere greater dependence on competitive market 
forces may be a practi cal alternative. To many economi sts as well as 
to "publ ic i nterest groups) " thi s t r'aditiona1 type of regu lation 
constitutes a form of protection for the existing firms in an industry, 
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serving as a barrier to the entry of new firms and thus shielding 
entrenched firms from potential new competition • 
I urge the avoidance of excessively simple approaches to this 
diffi cult subject . For example, I do think it appropriate to rely 
more heavil y on Rlarket forces where a reasonable contpeti tive market 
st ructure exi sts or is likely to develop~ Yet, we should not forget 
the bas i c natural monopoly (decreas ing cost) argument that has l ed 
. 
t o t he chartering of public uti l ities and the establishment of public 
utility regulatory commi ssions. In these cases, attention might 
bet ter be given to modernizi ng the often excessiyely protracted 
regulat ory process (e .g. , reducing regulatory lag) and to providing 
greater i ncentives to regulated companies to achieve higher l eve ls 
of productivity .and effi ciency. ~t -~. · •ho rl · f · f ~ a ~1nq ~ . ~ Jes1re o course 1s ar 
·-
easi er t han i dent ifying spec i fic courses of action. 
The newer forms of regulation constitute a more varied lot- -
dealing in general with the external public impacts of ostensibly 
private actions. In t he case of environmental protection, there is 
widespread although not universal agreement that the social costs of 
pol l ution warrant government intervention . However , there is 
• 
considerable disagreement as to the mast effective methods to use . 
Many economi sts prefer working through the price system rather t han 
re lying almost excl usively on promulgat ing standards and issuing 
specific regulations . Taxes (usually forms of .exci se or sumptuary 
l evies) are the preferred way of working through tl1e price mechanism to 
increase the relative prices of polluti on-intensi ve means of production 
and consumpti on~ and t hus hopefully promoting more ecologi cally sound 
production and consumption patterns. 
.. 
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In the case of other cross-industry types of regu1ator·y activity 
--such as job health, product safety, and employment discrimination ... -
benefit/ cost ana '! ys is may be a USE}fu l way of reconci l 'ir1g a variety of 
conflict ing attitudes and viewpoints. Contrary to the assertions of 
some, benefit/cost analysis is not a 11 green eye shade 11 approach which 
is only concerned with costs to business and is oblivious to the broader 
needs of and "irnpacts on the pub 1 i c. Rather, a pr·opet1y applied benefit/cost 
test ·is a way of a rrayi Dfl a 11 of the important impacts--good and bad, 
direct and indirect--that f1 ow from a government regulatory program. 
To be sure, ther·e are great difficulties in conducting appropriate 
benefit/cost analysis and many studies in practice fall very short of 
\<Jhat is desirable. But it is an analytical way of looking at government 
regulation which. is open-minded~ if not eclectic. There is no advance 
assurance that a benefiticost analysis vli"ll support a proposed regula .. 
tion or that it will condemn it. But properly conceived and properly 
executed, this approach wi 11 go a. 1 ong v~ay to ens uri n9 that the 
government 1 s decision maid ng process will try to take account of far 
more factors than traditionally has been the case. 
This type of analysis could be instituted through legislation via 
the 11 sunset 1t bi 11 s kJhi ch are nm.-J being considered in the Congress. 
These proposals \'muld require compulsory periodic reviews of each 
major regu1atory program. For example, the Regulatory Reform Act of 
1977 (S.600--the Percy-Byrd-Ribicoff Bill) sets an eight-year cycle 
over' ~rrhi ch the President is to submit reform propos a 1 s for each major 
reg.ulatary agency and for Congress reviewing those proposals. These 
propos.a 1 s are to ·inc Tude recommendations for increasing competition, 
. 
and for procedura1 ~· func.t ·iona1 ~ administrative, and structural reforms. 
... 11 ... 
The Congressional review is to be assisted by detailed studies by 
the Genera '1 Accounting Office and t he Congress ion a 1 Budget Office. 
The 11 Sunset11 mechanism (automatic termination of the regulatory agency) 
is provided over a period of time should Congress fail to enact reform 
legislation. 
The R0.gu1 atory Reform Act of 1977 appears at the present time 
to be an effective vehicle for improvement: it is comprehensive; the 
required changes are phased over a sensible period of time; the 
executive and legislative branches are both involved in the reform process; 
' . 
and a forcing mechanism (the 11 Sunset" approach) is used to trigger actions 
in this diffic~lt and controversial area . But the enactment of S.600 
is not necessari1y going to result in eli minating government regulation 
• 
or in expa.nding it. Rather, i.t provides t he opportunity and mechanism 
for modernizing and i mproving an aspect of gove r nment acti vities ·which 
has profound repercussions on the entire society. 
The enactment of this or· other legis l at i on t,sould sti ll require a 
fundamental turnaround in prevailing execut ive branch attitudes . A 
greater display of humi lity on t he part of regu1ators vJould be most 
welcome. In my own experience~ I he.ve .Yet t o come across the business 
execu·U ve who enjoys po 11 uti ng the 0nvi ronment or producing unsafe 
products,. kJhat r have found is honest disaC~reement as to t he most 
. .. .... 
effect i ve and sens ible ways in which to proceed i n attaini ng t he nation's 
so.cial objectives. 
Son:e Conc ludinn Thouqhts 
-· . . ?-~-... --........ ~~ ..  ... ··-At ...___ 
appraisal must acknowl edge that important and 
posi ti vi~ benefits huve resulted f rom mo.n.v of the government's regulatory 
I 
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activities--in terms of less pollution, fewer product hazards, reducing 
job discrimination, and achieving other socially desirable objectives 
of our society* It should a1 so be realized that these federal programs 
were established by the Congress in response to a surge of rising 
public expectations about corporate performance. 
But the "externa lities" generated by federal regulation need not 
justify government attempting to closely regulate every facet of 
private behavior. Indeed, the experience with existing governmental 
efforts indicates that further expansion of government involvement 
in the detail of business dec ision making is likely to be self-defeating. 
Rather, some restraint might yield great rewards. 
To be sure, the exercise of judgment in regulatory matters can 
involve striking·a balance in some extremely difficult areas, literally 
of human 1 i fe. As a former commi ssi or~er of food and drugs has stated, 
''In FDA decisions, as in all aspects of human endeavor, we must accept 
the probabi l ity of nonexistence of absolute safety." Dr. Alexander 
Schmidt went on to raise some very difficult questions: Just where and 
. 
when does one draw the line in weighing demonstrable benefit against 
theoretical risk? Who is to draw the line? Government or industry or 
the individual consumer? Dr. Schmidt criticized the anticancer clauses 
in existing food safety laws because, literally interpreted, they leave 
no room for scientifi c judgment, calling for zero risk from all new 
food ing.redients. 
A new attitude of restraint in imposing additional regulations on 
the private sector-·whi ch would 1 ower the risk and the cost of l"esearch 
and development by business--might well have a sa1utary effect on. the 
n,~~ o~ tc~hnA1(" ' 1 ~r~l t 'r .L .. r; J• .~ _. t .. · .'J . l!; ~\ ~f~!i 
United Stntes~ 
ci ti zc~n. 
• 
• 
. ' l • .\- • .r:. • 
·!nnovat1fH1 tHlCI scH~rn. l nc progress in the 
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